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FOREWORD: JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM V.
A PRINCIPLED JUDICIAL ACTMSM
RANDY

E.

BARNETT*

. JURISPRUDENCE AT THE RAMPARTS

We are in the midst of one of the more exciting periods in
this century for jurisprudence. In the wake of the Reagan administration's numerous judicial appointments, it is the rare
observer of the American legal scene who has not thought seriously about the proper role of the judge in enforcing the law.
Editorialists, columnists, and academicians are all debating in
one form or another the classic jurisprudential question:
"What is law?" While such questions have never completely
dropped from sight, we are now in a period of constructive intellectual turmoil much like those surrounding the Nuremburg
trials and the civil rights movement. Such periods are usually
characterized by, and perhaps caused by, a perception among
an influential elite that there is a lot at stake.
One of the most significant developments in the current debate has been a schism between conservative and classical liberal intellectuals on the issue of the proper role of the judiciary.
Some of these intellectuals have hewed to a stance known as
"judicial conservatism." Others have urged a more activist judicial role, a view that I have previously called "judicial
pragmactivism"' and that has recently been referred to as a
"principled judicial activism. '"2 This controversy among con* Associate Professor of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago-Kent College of Law. B.A. Northwestern University, 1974; J.D. Harvard Law School, 1977. Director of the Law and Philosophy Program of the Institute for Humane Studies at
George Mason University. I thank Linda Hirshman, Dan Tarlock, and Richard Wright
for their comments on an earlier version of this Foreword.

1. See Bamett,JudicialPragmactivism:A Definition, in ECONOMIC

LIBERTIES AND THEJU-

(J. Dora & H. Manne eds. forthcoming). An earlier version appeared at 4 CATO
J. 853 (1984).
2. See S. MACEDO, THE NEw RIGHT v. THE CoNs'rrtroN 43 (1986) ("[Tlhere is a
need for a constitutional vision with a robust conception ofjudicially enforceable rights
grounded in the text of the Constitution, in sound moral thinking, and in our political
tradition. A principledjudicialactivism would overcome the incoherence of the modem
Court's double standard.") (emphasis added). See also Dor, Economic Liberties and the
Judiciary,4 CAToJ. 661, 661 (1985) (describing the "resurgence of interest in constitutional economics and the role of the judiciary in protecting property rights and economic liberties."); Aranson, Judicial Control of the Political Branches: Public Purpose and
Public Law, 4 CATOJ. 719, 781 (1985) ("[T]he notion that the Court has embraced, that
the legislature is omnipotent in its redistributionist activities ....should now become a
DICIARY
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servatives and classical liberals surfaced in a 1984 debate between Justice Antonin Scalia and Professor Richard Epstein,'
and it is likely to continue for some time.4
While the papers in this symposium do not directly address
the issue of a principled judicial activism, the analysis they present has important implications for the substance of that position. In this Foreword, I will attempt to describe the
methodology of a principled judicial activism in a manner intended to respond to the legitimate concerns of judicial conservatives. I shall then sketch some important substantive
issues that deserve future consideration and discuss the relevance of the symposium papers to this jurisprudential
controversy.
II.

A.

WrT IS A JUDGE TO

Do?

The Judicial Conservative Answer

Both judicial conservatives and their critics are attempting to
answer the age-old question: When faced with conflicting
claimants as parties to a lawsuit, what is ajudge to do? Today's
judicial conservatives5 advise that judges should "follow the
law" and thatjudges should not "make law." In the tradition of
legal positivism, they tend to identify "the law" as the command of the sovereign, where the sovereign is "the people"
who exert their majority will through their representatives in
state legislatures and in the Congress. To judicial conservatives, judges are the "lieutenants" of the legislature who recandidate for serious judicial rethinking."); Pilon, Legislative Activism, Judicial Activism,
and the Decline ofPrivate Sovereignty, 4 CAToJ. 813, 832 (1985) (judges and scholars must
go "behind the Constitution to the rigorous, analytical theory of rights that alone can
legitimately inform its broad texture, that alone can justify our resort to force, which is
what government, in the end, is all about."). These three papers will be reprinted in
ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE JUDICIARY, supra note 1.
3. Scalia, EconomicAffairs as Human Affairs, 4 CATO J. 703, 707 (1985) (Conservatives
"must decide whether they really believe, as they have been saying, that the courts are
doing too much, or whether they are actually nursing only the less principled grievance
that the courts have not been doing what they want."); Epstein,JudicialReview: Rechoning
on Two Kinds of Error,4 CATOJ. 711, 718 (1985) ("[S]ome movement in the direction of
judicial activism is clearly indicated.").
4. The controversy continued in a recent debate among Professor Macedo, Professor Epstein, and Bruce Fein of the American Enterprise Institute sponsored by the
Cato Institute.
5. Caveat: It is probably impossible to summarize briefly the views ofjudicial conservatives without caricaturing them. Nonetheless, some summary effort is needed to
place a principled judicial activism in its proper perspective. For a more comprehensive
view of the brand of "judicial conservatism" I describe, see S. MACEDO, supra note 2.
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ceive their marching orders in the form of statutes. They view
the Constitution as a special qualification of this relationship by
which judges are also subservient to the sovereign will of a past
generation who imposed constraints on the future exercise of
legislative power.6
In short, judicial conservatives believe that judicial authority
extends only to judicial enforcement of the law enacted by the
requisite majority of duly elected representatives, whether that
law is a statute or the Constitution. They argue that because
any such enactment represents the authoritative voice of the
people, it should be "strictly construed" according to the
"original intent" of its framers. 7 Any deviation from the original intent lacks authority and is to be condemned as judicial fiat
or "lawmaking."'
Many judicial conservatives are peculiarly ambivalent about
the role that justice should play in judicial decisions. This ambivalence likely arises from the political conservatism of many
judicial conservatives. Political conservatives favor "doing justice" by punishing, even killing, criminals convicted of crimes,
call and for increasing the severity of sanctions currently imposed by statute. Judicial conservatives do not, however, explain when justice permits judges to rightfully depart from the
commands of the legislature, or if it ever does. This tension
creates the impression that "justice," like law itself, is determined solely by reference to majority preferences. It is this ambivalence that gives rise to the charge that judicial conservatism
amounts to majoritarianism only weakly fettered by constitutional constraints that are themselves grounded in
majoritarianism. 9
This is the crux of today's judicial conservatism: Judicial conservatives quite reasonably fear the "tyranny of the judiciary."
For them, legitimacy stems from popular or majority will.
6. See, e.g., Address by W. Rehnquist, The Edna Nelson Lecture at the University of
Missouri (Mar. 7, 1980) (on file at the HarvardJournalof Law & Public Policy). I discuss

the close connection between legal positivism and judicial conservatism and the anachronous reading of the Constitution that has resulted from this connection in Barnett,
Are Enumerated Constitutional Rights the Only Rights We Have: The Case of Associational Freedom, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 101 (1987).

7. For recent summaries and critiques of an "original intent" position, see Lyons,
ConstitutionalInterpretation and Original Meaning, 4 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 75 (1986); R.
DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE

313-37, 359-63 (1986).

8. Perhaps the best example of this approach is R. BORK, TRADrIION AND
IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

(1984).

9. See S. MACEDO, supra note 2, at 33-41.
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Therefore, they want to tightly bind judges to past expressions
of majority will by a methodology of "strict construction" and
"original intent." Consequently, adherence to a philosophy of
judicial conservatism can create great dissonance for political
conservatives and classical liberals who are sensitive to the
acute problems of individual liberty in a welfare state, particularly in the economic realm.
B. PrincipledJudicialActivism
If principled judicial activism were defined simply as judicial
activism in the service of some purpose, one could hardly distinguish it from conventional judicial activism.l° This is probably one reason why conservatives are so suspicious of the idea.
To its current proponents, however, a principled judicial activism means something considerably more specific. It calls for judicial development of substantive principles by which
legislation and constitutional provisions are to be evaluated.
Significantly, a principled judicial activism is based on a jurisprudential view that preceded the legal positivism of modern
judicial conservatives.
According to principled judicial activists, judges must indeed
"follow the law," but the law extends beyond legislative enactments to embrace substantive rules and standards used by
judges in evaluating legislation. Every judicial command entails
the use of force against one party to a lawsuit or the other, a
use of force that must be justified." Judges are therefore inescapably responsible for developing, justifying, and applying
substantive rules and standards for normatively evaluating
human conduct-including the conduct of legislators acting
collectively.
In all legal challenges to legislation, judges must choose between imposing the legislative will on an individual and enforcing the individual's claim that the legislation in question has
violated his or her rights. Under the principle of equality of
10. Elsewhere I applied the term "judicial pragmactivism" to any argument for judicial renew guided by moral principle. I then identified types ofjudicial pragmactivism:
equal-wealth pragmactivism, efficiency pragmactivism, and rights pragmactivism. See
Barnett, supra note 1.While the term "principled judicial activism" could be as broadly
construed as judicial pragmactivism, the particular variant discussed here corresponds
to the view I called rights pragmactivism.
11. See generally Lyons, supra note 7, at 78-80 (stressing the importance of moral justification in legal analysis).
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persons, no person may violate the rights of another, and this
must include legislators acting collectively (and judges too).
Legislative action is but a subset of human action that "the
law" functions to evaluate and regulate. In deciding an individual's claim of right, the judiciary must evaluate both the legislation and the individual's action. The judiciary therefore cannot
avoid responsibility for developing substantive standards by
which it chooses between the legislation and the individual's
claim of right.
The position that judges must always defer to legislative fiat
is itself a claim of political morality. Such a claim requires justification. While the best justification of a judicial decision might
depend on the existence of a statute enacted by a popularly
elected legislature, the very substantive rules and standards developed to support such a preference might also on occasion
undermine the legitimacy of an act of legislative will. In other
words, principled judicial activists answer the fundamental
question "What is a judge to do?" by instructing the judiciary
that its assessments of legal disputes may be justified by the
popular sentiment expressed in legislation and in the Constitution. This, however, is neither the only possible justification
nor an irrebuttable one.
A principled judicial activism immediately raises important
questions, the last three of which are methodological: By what
right are judicial standards imposed on legislative acts? In what
manner are substantive standards to be developed? What deference does a judge owe to legislation? Who has the last word
on a controversy over such matters?
III.

By WHAT

RIGHT MAY JUDGES EVALUATE

LEGISLATIVE ACTS?

For today's judicial conservatives, the question of judicial
right to evaluate legislative acts may be the most important
question of all. All legislators are elected. All federal and many
state court judges are appointed, not elected; those judges who
are elected are not elected to "legislate." Judicial conservatives
ask: By what right does a judge thwart the expressed will of a
popularly elected legislature?
Notice first of all that this question is based on an important
and usually implicit and undefended assumption-that the will
of the majority adequately justifies forcibly imposing rules on a
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nonconsenting minority. One is tempted to ask the following
questions in return: By what right does a majority impose its
will on a nonconsenting minority? Afortiori, by what right does
a simple majority of elected legislators, who themselves represent the consent of only a simple majority of the electorate
(consisting, most likely, of a mere plurality of the citizenry), impose its will on the other members of society and their descendants? Or to put the question even more pointedly: By
what right does a legislature consisting of a minority of the citizenry impose its will on anyone but itself?
Of course, such question swapping does not itself provide
any answers, but it does place judicial conservatives and proponents of a principled judicial activism on a more even rhetorical
footing. A "level playing field" is the current expression.
Neither school can blithely assume its view ofjudicial authority;
each must explain and justify its views, and neither effort atjustification will be easy. Moreover, each attempt at justification
will have to come to grips with issues of "the good" and "the
right." Even a "might makes right" approach must resort to
some concept of right.
What then might authorize a judge to thwart the act of a legislature? Suppose the legislative process that produced a statute was shown to be defective in some important way. If so, this
legislative pronouncement might be viewed as lacking its normal majoritarian authoritative force. As this "procedural due
process" basis of judicial authority also gains textual support
from the "Due Process" Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, most judicial conservatives are willing to go this
far. 12
This basis of judicial review, however, is exhausted when a
statute is procedurally legitimate. Such a statute would have
whatever authority majoritarian pronouncements are thought
to possess. 13 When a statute is procedurally sound, is there any
possible authority for ajudge to stand in the way? Here, today's
principled judicial activist would part company from the judi12. See, e.g., W. Rehnquist, supra note 6, at 18 ("For popular sovereignty or majority
rule to have substance as well as form, it must have an institutional infrastructure which
permits public political opposition and frank and spirited criticisms of the policies followed by the government then in power.").
13. But see Pilon, supra note 2, at 822-27 (questioning the fundamental legitimacy of
political power).
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cial conservative and answer that the "rights of the individual"
might still support judicial review.
Surely, however, this is a wholly inadequate response. For
has not moral, if not legal, positivism established beyond question that the only rights individuals can be said to have are
those rights given to them by the sovereign? Is not any discussion of natural rights "nonsense" (and any discussion of imprescriptable natural rights "nonsense upon stilts")?' 4 Do not
substantive rights claims unavoidably assume the existence of a
"brooding omnipresence in the sky?"' 5 Are not claims of right
''mere assertions" that do not substitute for reasoned policy
analysis?' 6
In light of the similar questions that judicial conservatives
must answer, however, this traditional litany loses much of its
impact, for anyone engaging in intellectual discourse who believes in the rightfulness of majority rule must justify that belief. If he refuses to do so, he abandons intellectual discourse
itself and requires no further response. Justifying the rights of
groups is certainly no easier than justifying the rights of individuals. Indeed, it has traditionally proved much more difficult.
Moreover, the absence of irrefutable proof of either individual or group rights is no cause for a nihilist or relativist conclusion on the subject. ' While hard proofs are not forthcoming,1 8
each of us, including judges, must still act in their absence.
This means that we each must somehow choose among alternative courses of conduct. To act rationally is not to refrain from
14. This epithet was used by Jeremy Bentham. Bentham, Anarchical Fallacies, in
HUMAN RIGHTs 28, 32 (A. Meldon ed. 1970).
15. This epithet was used by Justice Oliver W. Holmes, Jr. in Southern Pac. Co. v.
Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
16. This epithet was used by most of my law professors. I have found it printed inJ.
KAPLAN, THE HARDEST DRUG: HEROIN AND PUBLIC POLICY 103 (1983) ("The problem
with such 'rights' is that they are merely assertions. They do not carry arguments with
them.") This view misses the vital methodological distinction between a rights analysis
and one based on public policy. See Barnett, Public Decisions and Private Rights (Book
Review), GRIM. JUST. ETHics, Summer/Fall 1984, at 50.
17. For a useful discussion of moral scepticism, see R. DWORIN, supra note 7, at 7885.
18.
Our discussion will be adequate if it achieves clarity within the limits of
the subject matter. For precision cannot be expected in all subjects alike, any
more than it can be expected in all manufactured articles. Problems of what is
noble and just... present so much variety and irregularity that some people
believe that they exist only by convention and not by nature .... [A] wellschooled man is one who searches for that degree of precision in each kind of
study which the nature of the subject at hand admits ....
ARISTOTLE, NiCHOMACHEAN ETHics 5 (M. Ostwald trans. 1962).
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all action until perfect knowledge of its correctness is obtained;
it is to act on the basis of the best reasons available to us. So
the proper inquiry in this, as in all intellectual discourse, is to
ask what choice is supported not by perfect reasons, but by the
best reasons.1 9
To sum up the analysis to this point: Judges must decide between conflicting claims of right. That is their job. Therefore,
they and we cannot avoid deciding if and when they should follow the commands of the "sovereign," and if and when they
should instead enforce a conflicting claim of right by an individual. In contrast with judicial conservatism, a principled judicial activism is clear on the point that individual rights are
potentially distinct from the rights of a sovereign. Moreover,
this view finds textual support in the Constitution of the United
States.
Following closely on the heels of the natural rights-based
Declaration of Independence, the Constitution explicitly supports a natural rights view. 20 In addition to employing such
normative terms as "due process of law," "just compensation,"
the "obligation of contract," "privileges or immunities," and
"life, liberty, or property," the Constitution contains the following declaration: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be2 construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people." '
Thus, even if they are "personally" hostile to natural rights
theories, judicial conservatives who subscribe to a doctrine of
"original intent" are obliged by the Constitution to assume argundo that such rights exist. And if such rights are assumed to
exist, then it is reasonable (though not, of course, uncontroversial) to conclude that the Article III power of the courts ex19. Of course, I do not address here the meta-ethical issue of what constitutes the
"best" reasons. The evaluative problem here, however, is not all that different from the
question, discussed by philosophers of science, of what constitutes a "good" scientific
argument. In either field we are not frozen in our tracks until philosophers settle the
question. We must act and evaluate both without ironclad principles and without criteria for evaluating the principles at our disposal. Yet there are both wise and foolish
ways to proceed. Much of this meta-evaluative knowledge is reposed in our evolved and
ever-evolving traditions and tacitly reposed in us as a result. See M. PoLANyi, THE STUDY
OF MAN 11-39 (1959) (discussing the importance of tacit knowledge and contrasting it
with explicit knowledge).
20. See H. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR (1981); 1 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTrrUTION 424-27 (P. Kurland & R. Lerner eds. 1987).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. IX (emphasis added). I will discuss the meaning and importance of the Ninth Amendment at greater length in the foreword to a forthcoming
republication of B. PATTERSON, THE FORGOTTEN NINTH AMENDMENT (1955).
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tending "to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution.... 22gives courts the authority to include them
among their criteria of decisionmaking.
Elsewhere I have tried to defend the reasonableness of an
individual rights position, 23 and I shall not repeat or summarize that analysis here. It would be helpful, however, to address
certain methodological concerns. For when it is proposed that
judges may enforce some set of pre-constitutional rights, certain questions immediately arise: By what method are such
evaluative decisions to be made? Do we leave it up to individual
judges to decide cases entirely on their own? More specifically,
is any single judge free to override the explicit mandate of a
popular assembly?
Many who would otherwise be attracted to an individual
rights approach may be led to embrace judicial conservatism
and reject a principled judicial activism because of these methodological or process-oriented concerns, rather than because
of any deep philosophical scepticism. In contrast, the objections that modern political liberals and socialists might make to
today's principled judicial activism may be more substantive in
nature.
IV.
A.

THE METHODOLOGY OF A PRINCIPLED JUDICIAL ACTIVISM

How Are Substantive Standards of Evaluation Developed?

In a search for reasons that justify ajudicial decision to permit the use of force against an individual (or to refuse to permit
its use), we seek a kind of knowledge: the subset of moral
knowledge that concerns the nature and scope of individual
rights. One potential source of this or any moral knowledge is
popular opinion. Popular opinion is the source of knowledge
relied on almost exclusively by democratic theory, that is, a theory favoring rule by majority electoral institutions.
While much of this democratic theory has been effectively
undercut by the writings of the "public choice" school, 24 this
22. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. See also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137
(1803).
23. See Barnett, supra note 16; Barnett, PursuingJusticein a Free Society: PartOne-Power
v. Liberty, CRIM.JusT. ETHics, Summer/Fall, 1985, at 50; Barnett, Foreword: Why We Need
Legal Philosophy, 8 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1 (1985). I discuss substantive aspects of
individual rights in the articles cited infra note 43.
24. See, e.g., J. BUCHANAN, THE LIMITS OF LIBERTY (1975).
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need not worry us now, because any imaginable legal system
will be thoroughly saturated by popular opinion. Like it or not,
knowledge of popular opinion naturally and unavoidably pervades our legal system. To paraphrase Dylan, judges and lawyers do not usually need a pollster to know which way the
popular wind is blowing. The democratic objection of judicial
conservatives to judicial "discretion" is not that judges do not
know what popular opinion dictates. It is that, unlike elected
representatives, they cannot be held accountable to it.
While not without considerable value as a source of moral
intuition, popular opinion is nonetheless highly unreliable and
largely question-begging as a source of moral knowledge of individual rights. Easy cases of rights violations are usually consistent with popular opinion. That is why they are easy. Most
hard cases involve situations where there is either no consensus
of popular opinion on the question or where the consensus of
popular opinion is against the person asserting a claim of right.
When popular opinion is unclear or against a claim of right, the
judiciary must critically assess the claim's validity. A resort to
popular opinion for this assessment is circular.
Consequently, in these hard cases, if not most adjudicated
cases, what judges need are sources of moral knowledge that
are at least somewhat distinct from popular opinion. In the Anglo-American legal system, the two most important sources of
moral knowledge are and have always been tradition and reason.
The American legal system (and its English antecedent) consists of far more than judges deciding cases in government
courts. This system is comprised of manifold institutions and
practices that have woven an extremely intricate pattern of law
from these two strands of knowledge. 25
1. Sources of Legal Tradition
The two most historically important sources of legal tradition
are the doctrine of precedent and doctrinal legal scholars.
Legal precedent is the product of countless decisions ofjudges
in countless numbers of cases. Although there is usually some
authority on both sides of any issue, the trend-the so-called
25. One writer who is much belittled by conservatives for his political liberalism, but

who has long stressed the constraints inherent to a process ofjudicial decisionmaking
that produces a "proper decision," is Ronald Dworkin. See Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1060 (1975); R. DWORKIN, supra note 7.
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"majority rule" or "minority rule"-is usually revealing. The
doctrine of precedent does more than encourage us to treat
like cases alike, though from a moral perspective this is one important justification for the practice. 2 6 It also constitutes an
ongoing referendum of judicial judgment, a referendum that
includes the published wisdom (and folly) of all judges past and
present. When a judge reads opinions, he or she learns not
only the reasons given for prior decisions, but also the other
judges' view of the factual situations that surrounded the
decisions.
The doctrine of precedent provides ajudge who, is deciding a
case here and now with a great deal of assistance and a good
deal of restraint. In a legal system that accepts a doctrine of
precedent, parties may obtain appellate review of a judge's interpretation of precedent or a judge's refusal to adhere to precedent. In our common law system, the doctrine of precedent
binds intermediate appellate courts as well as trial courts, and
prior decisions are treated deferentially by state supreme
courts and the Supreme Court of the United States.
In contrast with published judicial opinions, doctrinal legal
scholars provide a more systematic view of a body of decisions.2 7 In their massive treatises, such writers as James Kent,28
Samuel Williston, 29 and John Henry Wigmore 30 extracted general rules and principles from the holdings of cases and communicated these to lawyers and judges. While doctrinal legal
scholars still exist-in the field of contract law, E. Alan Farnsworth comes to mind3 -the present intellectual climate has
not been conducive to their production. 32 The resulting gap in
26. See R. WASSERsTROM, THEJUDICIAL DECISION: TOWARD A THEORY OF LEGALJUSTIFICATIoN 60-73 (1961) (discussing four justifications for the doctrine of precedent:

certainty, reliance, equality, and efficiency).
27. See E. PATTERSON, JURISPRUDENCE: MEN AND IDEAS OF THE LAW 217-23 (1953)

(discussing the legal role played by treatise writers and other "legal experts").
28. J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (De Capo ed. 1971) (New York
1827).
29. See S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1920).
30. SeeJ. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW (1904).
31. See E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS (1982).
32. See Simpson, The Rise and Fallof the Legal Treatise: Legal Principles and the Forms of
Legal Literature,48 U. CI. L. REV. 632, 674-79 (1981) (discussing the intellectual trends
responsible for the decline of doctrinal scholarship in treatise form); cf Barnett, Contract Scholarship and the Reemergence of Legal Philosophy (Book Review), 97 HARv. L. REV.
1223 (1984) (discussing recent trends injurisprudence that gave renewed credence to
doctrinal legal scholarship). Because theoretical legal scholarship is so greatly rewarded today among the faculties of the "elite" law schools, young academics at these
institutions may not have adequate incentive to commit themselves to the life-long te-
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sources of doctrinal legal knowledge has been filled largely by
the Restatements of the Law volumes produced by the American
Law Institute (A.L.I.) and the West Reporter System, with its
anonymous headnote authors and categorizers.
Of course, doctrinal legal scholars have always applied their
own analyses to the data they reported, as did such famous judicial opinion writers as Justices Holmes and Cardozo, and
Judge Hand. Our legal tradition has never been inert. Judges
and doctrinal scholars shape the legal tradition as they report
on it. Normal social life provides an animating force by generating an endless stream of disputes requiring resolution. As
soon as a rule or principle is devised and announced, circumstances will cause clients and lawyers to conspire to test it at its
margins. If it is found wanting by future judges and doctrinal
legal scholars, a rule will be modified or rejected.
Judges and doctrinal scholars vote on what the law is with
their pens, and the consensus that emerges from this process
defines the appropriate boundaries of argumentation. This
ongoing injection of knowledge into tradition accounts in part
for the evolution of tradition. 3 An unquestioned legal history
contains and conveys to us only limited moral information.3 4
2.

Sources of Reason

Reason is certainly injected into the legal system by doctrinal
legal scholars who reshape as they systematize bodies of law. In
recent times, however, a singularly important role has been
played by legal scholars using theoretical techniques that stand
apart from pure doctrinal analysis. 5 Rather than report or sysdium of treatise writing and the constant updating that doctrinal legal scholarship requires. As a result, the traditional leadership status of faculty at elite law schools in this
form of scholarship may be eroding, and primary responsibility for doctrinal legal
scholarship may be shifting to professors at the so-called "regional" law schools. One
wonders what the long-term effects of such a trend will be for institutional prestige.
33. One jurisprudential writer who has stressed the relationship between tradition
and the evolution of knowledge is F.A. Hayek. See, e.g., F. HAYEK, 1 LAw, LEIst.rmN
AND LIBERTY (1973).
34. One concern that arises from a heavy reliance on the West Reporter System is
that by merely reporting the data and making no effort to reconcile it, we are degrading
our legal traditions and thereby undermining the value of precedent as a repository of
moral knowledge. If a historian tried to record everything that happened without exercising any critical insight about what was important, what would be the value of the
result except as data for other more critical analysts? Without doctrinal scholars injecting knowledge into precedent, we may be forced to rely unduly on the reason of legal
theory.
35. One of the few American writers who has described the law-shaping role played
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tematize, these theorists try to distance themselves from legal
practice so that they can critically analyze the decisions of
judges and legislators. They seek to learn if these decisions can
be rationally explained and justified. At least four groups play
an important role in the process of theoretical legal analysis:
theoretical legal scholars, lawyers acting as advocates, judicial
clerks, and law journal editors.
Most theorizing is done by full-time law school professors,
who may or may not also be doctrinal legal scholars. While it is
a great advantage to analyze law both theoretically and doctrinally, many persons are more adept at seeing the forest than
they are in examining the trees (and vice versa). These days,
the forum of choice for legal theory is the elite law review and
the occasional book. For each legal subject, there is a community of theorists who spend most of their time engaging one
another in a written and verbal conversation concerning the
justification and rationalization of legal doctrine and practice.
Legal theorists borrow from philosophers just as they borrow from the doctrinal legal scholars, economists, and others
to obtain the stuff from which a flash of theoretical insight
might emerge. Once conceived, their ideas are shaped by colleagues' comments, law school workshops, the processes of
publication, and ensuing post-publication discourse. The very
few ideas that reach the consciousness of the legal community
and survive can remold and even revolutionize doctrinal thinking on a given subject.
Lawyer-advocates, judicial clerks, and law review editors usually lack the time, patience, or sometimes the skill to engage in
deep legal theory, but they play a vital role in the theoretical
process nonetheless. They transmit the reason of the theorist
from the ivory tower to the real world of cases and controversies. These intermediary groups read the writings of the theoretical legal scholars. As law review editors they select the
papers that are published and help the theorists refine their
ideas. Lawyers and judicial clerks attempt to harness these theories in the service of their clients and their judges.
For their ideas to be heard, legal theorists must somehow
make their analyses appealing to these intermediary groups.
Theories that pass this threshold must still "work" in the legal
by legal scholars is George Fletcher. See Fletcher, Two Modes of Legal Thought, 90

LJ. 970 (1981).
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system. To have any impact on legal tradition, they must withstand the rigors of practice and be accepted by judges. Only if
they become a part of the legal tradition will they be handed
down to future generations, who in turn will stand ready to improve upon the received wisdom.
B.

The Electorate of Law: JudicialDiscretion Revisited

The preceding analysis only begins to capture the social epistemology of how judges escape from popular opinion and their
own preferences, and obtain the moral knowledge they need to
decide cases in a principled and morally justified manner, to
decide when to side with the individual against the legislature.
Even this brief and greatly simplified picture, however, hardly
reveals a world of individual judges drawing on blank slates.
There is a far more intricate balloting going on here than is
possible in any legislature (or in the A.L.I.). Unlike the legislative process, this is a balloting that can take into account far
more than today's popular opinion (although this is not entirely excluded).
The "electorate of law" includes judges, scholars, lawyers,
clerks, law students, and philosophers, living and dead. Their
votes are weighted according to the respect each has earned
from peers and from succeeding generations and from the status of the institutions from which they speak. As a result of the
collective decision of the faculty of my law school to hire me to
teach contract law (and later to grant me tenure), my decision
to write, and ajournal's decision to publish what I have written,
I have a vote; but my vote is not as heavily weighted as, for
example, Grant Gilmore's, Lon Fuller's, or many others. They
may be gone, but they are not forgotten; the votes they cast
while alive have survived them.
There is no guarantee that the outcome of this intricate balloting process will be correct, that the process will inevitably
produce genuine progress. While all the law that survives may
by definition be "fit," all that survives may not be right. The
moral knowledge conveyed by this mechanism, however, makes
real progress possible. For better or worse, one judge's ability
to influence the electoral tide is clearly marginal: His or her
opinion must be accepted by others before it becomes "the
law."
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A judge's opinion will, however, decide the docketed case. If
he or she is wrong about the law, for the sake of the parties we

cannot rely solely on the electorate of law to correct the error.
We need a more direct mechanism to protect innocent parties:
appellate review. While appellate review also contributes im-

portantly to the development of moral knowledge, it is virtually
the only mechanism to correct individual adjudicative errors. It

constrains judges from straying too far from the current legal
consensus at the expense of litigants.
Nevertheless, it is always tempting to point to local practice
where judicial conduct is often dominated by aberrant and unreviewed exercises of discretion. Many practicing lawyers who
care deeply about the integrity of the institution of law can become demoralized by this sort of experience, which can sometimes seem all pervasive. Nonetheless, while aberrant (and
corrupt) judges certainly decide the outcomes of many cases,
they cannot "make law" that will effectively bind parties in
other cases unless their decisions survive the socio-legal filtration mechanisms described here. Judges are accountable to the
electorate of law.
A principled judicial activism, then, is hardly the world of unfettered judicial tyranny painted by some judicial conservatives
and feared by many more. The judicially-driven common law
system develops substantive standards that are as much a product of collective wisdom as the statutory output of Congress,
perhaps more. With the many real constraints a common law
system places on judges, it is perhaps astounding that any
evolution of law actually occurs, that creative judicial "lawmaking" (beyond individual cases) exists at all. Maybe this is why
the progress of the common law has sometimes seemed to be
so painfully slow.
C. JudicialDeference in an Era of Legislative Inflation
The precise stance a judge is entitled to take towards legislation depends in no small measure on the practice of legislation
in a given society. Ours is a legal world that bears the heavy
mark of both the codification and "progressive" movements of
the Nineteenth Century. There was a time when statutes were
far more extraordinary than they are today. At that time, statutes were used to establish much needed conventions, such as
those specifying the formal requirements of certain kinds of
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rights transfers. Three important examples are the Statute of
Frauds, 6 the Statute of Wills, 3 7 and statutes of limitations.
These statutes were very "strictly construed" by judges, which
in this context meant that there was lots of room for judges to
craft exceptions. These statutes were also striking for their longevity. The Statute of Frauds of 1677 is remarkably similar to
state statutes of frauds today.3 s
An important impetus behind the codification movement and
the progressive movement was a desire to "rationalize," systematize, and, most of all, to speed the evolution of law. As a
result we now have a never-ending deluge of ever-changing expressions of legislative will. The "Blankety-Blank Act of 1986"
yields the "Blankety-Blank Reform Act of 1987" as well as ad
hoc statutory amendments, volumes of manufactured "legislative histories," and reams of administrative regulations that are
needed to explain the act. In sum, we have witnessed a veritable legislative inflation and the consequent diminution of value
that the inflation of any commodity inevitably entails.
Moreover, modern public choice analysis has restored to intellectual respectability the constitutional framer's fervent preoccupation with problems of political faction. As a result, it has
greatly undermined the "public interest" myth that for so long
pervaded judicial and academic treatments of legislative acts.
Public choice analysis also explains the vagueness of today's
statutes. The statutes are deliberately rendered vague to enable
politicians to support particular legislation that pleases certain
constituencies without alienating others. This deliberate vagueness shifts the battle over a statute's meaning away from the
legislature into the administrative process and the courts. In
these circumstances, judges must either strike down a statute
or give it some meaning.
More than any time since the "progressive era," the rhetoric
of legislative supremacy based on an alleged public interest
now appears to be so much whistling past the graveyard. Genuine authority must be earned. In such an inflationary environment, the deference judges owe to legislative enactments must
be greatly reduced. In short, legislative activism gives rise to a
need for a principled judicial activism.
36. An Act for Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries, 29 Car. 2, ch. 3 (1677).
37. 32 Hen. 8, ch. 1 (1540).
38. See, e.g., U.C.G. §§ 1-206, 2-201 (1972).
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Who Has the Last Word on What the Law Is?

The system of appellate review, of course, defines the last
word on the outcome of any given lawsuit. Within any conceivable legal system administered by human beings, there is no
real "last word" on the law itself. In contrast with the legislative
process, however, the Anglo-American common law system has
been far better able to produce lasting words.3 9
V.

SUBSTANTIVE SPECULATIONS

These methodological concerns do not exhaust the questions raised by a principled judicial activism. The most important of those remaining to be discussed is the substance of the
standards that judges should use to evaluate both individual
acts and the acts of legislative groups. In this section I will confine myself to identifying the direction being urged by today's
proponents of a principled judicial activism.
We are accustomed to differentiating between private law
and public law.4 0 Those who question this distinction would
convert all private law analysis into a public law analysis. 1 In
contrast, today's principled judicial activism assesses the appropriate content of public law by building on a base of private law
rights rationally gleaned from the traditional common law
processes described above.4 2 While I will not further defend
this conception here,43 at its heart lies the Lockean concepts of
"private property," that is, self-ownership and private ownership of external resources, and "freedom of contract," that is,
free exchanges of justly acquired entitlements.
This "traditional" legacy of private law rights has been subjected to the withering "rational" attack of generations of legal
and philosophical intellectuals. While it has withstood this on39. See Epstein, The Static Conception of the Common Law, 9J. LEGAL STUD. 253 (1980).
40. See Barnett, Foreword: Four Senses of the Public Law-Private Law Distinction, 9 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'y 267 (1986).
41. See, e.g., Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/PrivateDistinction, 130 U. PA.
L. REV. 1349, 1351-52 (1982) (discussing the alleged collapse of the distinction between public law and private law).
42. The most ambitious effort to date is R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND
THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985).

43. I discuss some substantive aspects of individual rights elsewhere. See Barnett,
PursuingJustice, supra note 23; Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
269 (1986); Barnett, Contract Remedies and Inalienable Rights, 4 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 179
(1986); Barnett, TheJustice of Restitution, 25 AM.J.JuRIS. 117 (1980); Barnett, Restitution:
A New Paradigm of CriminalJustice, 87 ETHIcs 279 (1977).
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slaught surprisingly well, the private law of contract, property,
and tort has not been unchanged by it. Some changes have
been for the better, others reflect an undesirable injection of
competing and inconsistent philosophies. (Some discordant
strains were, of course, always present.) Only in the past two
decades has the tide of this "rational" challenge begun to be
stemmed by the analysis of legal theorists who are sympathetic
to the principles underlying our common law heritage.
VI.

CONCLUSION: THE TRUE SOURCE OF

CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY

When I limited my discussion of the sources of moral knowledge to tradition and reason, some may have wondered why I
omitted the Constitution from the list. I did so because, ultimately, in my view, a constitution only has authority to the extent that it comports with our best moral knowledge. A
constitution has authority if the framework it establishes generally fits our best conception of individual rights. If this fit is
established, a judge must enforce the constitutional scheme
that was actually enacted, not a different one that might be
more appealing to him or her personally.
Recently, Professor Epstein has argued powerfully, if not altogether persuasively,4 4 that the Constitution of the United
States passes this threshold test of fit. 45 Assuming that it does,

judges must look to the Constitution for two kinds of guidance.
The first is guidance in interpreting the "background" private
rights of individuals. 46 Earlier I quoted certain textual passages
that support in a general fashion the natural background rights
view of property and contract that are revealed by the common
law process. These rights are not created by the Constitution.
These passages merely add textual support to the view that the
44. See Hummel, Epstein's Takings Doctrineand the Public Goods Problem (Book Review),

65 T~x. L. REV. -, - (forthcoming) ("Either Epstein's minimal State is necessary and
therefore unattainable, or it is attainable and therefore unnecessary.").
45. See R. EPSTEIN, supra note 42; Epstein, Taxation in a Lockean World, 4 Soc. PHIIL. &
POL'Y 49 (1986).
46. I discuss the distinction between "background" and "institutional" rights in a
Constitutional context in Barnett, supra note 6, at 108. The distinction was advanced by
Ronald Dworkin in Hard Cases,supra note 25, at 1078-82. This article became chapter 4
of R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTs SERIOUSLY (1977). However, in LAw's EMPIRE (1986),
Professor Dworkin's most recent and comprehensive statement of his position, it appears to play little role, if any.
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Constitution was not the source of all our rights but was instead created to protect these pre-existing rights.
The second aspect of constitutional guidance is the "institutional" rights a constitution does in fact create.4 7 To protect
the individual from the governmental structure it establishes,
the Constitution grants individuals certain enumerated rights
against the government, for example, the right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. Whether or not such institutional rights are also background rights is normally irrelevant. A judge is empowered by the Constitution to enforce
these institutional limitations on governmental powers unless
they clash with background rights.4 8
In a regime of principled judicial activism, then, the substance of the law is determined by the ideas that prevail in the
inescapable intellectual struggle that produces all socially accepted knowledge. There is no such thing as a final victory, and
there is no avoiding the turbulence of moral and theoretical
discourse by retreating to the shelter of judicial deference to
legislative will. In the end, one can run but one cannot hide. If
the threats to substantive individual rights posed by legislative
acts are not confronted in the classroom and the courtroom,
they will most surely be confronted in the bedroom and the
boardroom. When this happens, the law will have failed us because we have failed it.
VII.

THE

IHS

SYMPOSIUM ON LAW AND PHILOSOPHY

The debate between judicial conservatives and those favoring a principled judicial activism reflects a longstanding jurisprudential debate. For many years, Professor Lon L. Fuller
pressed this point in the face of widespread intellectual dis47. Some such distinction between background and institutional rights was not unknown to the Founders. See M. GOODMAN, THE Nxirn AMENDMENT 46 (1981) (" 'Natural rights are those which appertain to man in the right of his existence-civil rights are
those which appertain to man in right of his being a member of society.'" (quoting
John Dickerson)).
48. The priority of background over institutional rights can affect the interpretation
of institutional rights and remedies. For example, in a system of restitution, the remedy of excluding reliable evidence of guilt obtained in violation of the institutional
right to be free from unreasonable searches would deprive victims of rights violations
of their background right to reparations from the offender. This would argue in favor
of a compensatory remedy for violations of such institutional rights. See Barnett, Resolving the Dilemma of the Exclusionary Rule: An Application of Restitutive PrinciplesofJustice, 32
EMORY LJ. 937 (1983) (compensation will better deter police misconduct than the exclusionary rule).

292

HarvardJournal of Law & Public Policy

[Vol. 10

interest. He persisted in reminding us that jurisprudence belonged at the ramparts. 49 He clearly saw the stark
jurisprudential choice we face:
I have insisted that law be viewed as a purposeful enterprise,
dependent for its success on the energy, insight, intelligence, and conscientiousness of those who conduct it, and
fated, because of this dependence, to fall always somewhat
short of a full attainment of its goals. In opposition to this
view it is insisted that law must be treated as a manifested
fact of social authority or power, to be studied for what it50is
and does, and not for what it is trying to do or become.
It is, then, altogether fitting that this Symposium on Law and
Philosophy contains the first three recipients of Lon L. Fuller
Prizes in Jurisprudence, a prize that will be awarded annually
by the Institute for Humane Studies at George Mason University. Moreover, each of the contributions has important implications for a principled judicial activism.
In his paper, The Perils of Positivism or Lon Fuller's Lesson on
Looking at Law: Neither Science nor Mystery-Merely Method, Professor Robert Moffatt explores Professor Fuller's influential critique of legal positivism and tries to put Professor Fuller's
account of natural law in perspective. A principled judicial activism unavoidably relies on the existence of a moral knowledge that is both accessible to a judge and subject to rational
evaluation by legal processes. Professor Moffat's important
point is that Professor Fuller tried to hold a middle ground between scientific verification and mystery. Only if some such
middle ground can be held will a principled judicial activismor any rational criticism of law-succeed. In his comment,
Daniel Wueste explores the relationship between Lon Fuller's
legal philosophy and the positivist and natural law traditions,
arguing that Professor Fuller's emphasis on legal processes
rather than on individual legal views provides a valuable perspective on the problem of the separability of law and morals.
ProfessorJohn T. Sanders critically assesses the merits of the
Lockean Proviso injustice and the InitialAcquisition of Property. In
light of the Lockean origins of our legal tradition and the re49. See, e.g., L. FULLER, The Needs of American Legal Philosophy, in THE PRINCIPLES OF
249, 249-50 (K. Winston, ed. 1981) ("[T]he object of legal philosophy is
to give effective and meaningful direction to the work of lawyers, judges, legislators,
and law teachers.").
SOCIAL ORDER

50. L. FULLER, THE MORALrrY OF LAW 145 (rev. ed. 1969).
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cent powerful Neo-Lockean theoretical defenses of that tradition, it becomes important to take seriously Locke's own
expressed reservations on the private acquisition of wealth.
Professor Sanders gives a lucid account of the Proviso and its
conceptual difficulties. He also discusses the strengths and
weaknesses of a Lockean labor-mixing criterion of property acquisition. In his comment, Geoffrey Miller offers a different account of the Lockean Proviso. Professor Miller justifies his very
interesting and unconventional efficiency interpretation of the
Proviso by a textual examination of Locke's underlying motives
for devising it.
In A Justificationof Social Wealth Maximization As a Rights-Based
Ethical Theory, Professor Lloyd Cohen defends the principle of
wealth-maximization as an ethical norm to demonstrate the
close connection between moral principles and legal analysis. A
principled judicial activism must depend upon the moral validity of its animating principles. While a Lockean principle of natural rights has been the dominant theme of principled judicial
activists, others, such as Judge Richard Posner, have advocated
the principle of social wealth maximization. 5 Of course, its advocates must justify positing wealth maximization as a moral
basis for legal decisions. Professor Cohen's paper is an effort in
this direction. In his comment, Professor Thomas Morawetz
takes strong issue with Professor Cohen and, while doing so,
also makes some important methodological observations.
In addition to these three IHS Fuller Prize-winning papers
we present two papers by IHS Leonard P. Cassidy Fellows in
Law and Philosophy. Daniel Klein, in Tie-ins and the Market Provision of Collective Goods, and David Schmidtz, in Contracts and
Public Goods, both critically examine the "public goods problem." Today, public goods analysis is perhaps the leading intellectual justification for government interference in a free
market. That this is of particular importance to principled judicial activism is exemplified by the heavy reliance Richard Epstein has placed on "free-rider" problems to legitimate
government efforts to force certain exchanges. 5 2
51. See, e.g., Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103

(1979).
52. See R. EPSTEIN, supra note 42, at 331-34, 337-38; Epstein, Taxation, supra note 45,
at 51-54; but cf. Hummel, supra note 44, at - (responding to Epstein's public goods

argument).
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Commentator David Friedman agrees with much of both Mr.
Klein's and Mr. Schmidtz's theses, but questions whether their
analyses support the scope of their stated conclusions. He also
adds a crucial public choice insight to the discussion: that in
assessing the efficacy of permitting the government to force
certain exchanges, the costs of the market's failure to provide
an optimal amount of public goods must always be compared
with the costs of the "government failure" that is likely to arise
in trying to provide them. He suggests that a "public good
problem" might not be a problem worth resorting to government to solve.
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